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Ervin Kapos was one of the founding
directors of MORS in 1966. This article in-
cludes both an interview of Mr. Kapos as
well as his remarks at the MORS Heritage
Session at the 71st MORS Symposium at
Quantico, Virginia, 11 June 2003.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
INTERVIEW WITH ERVIN KAPOS
July 27, 2004
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA
DR. BOB SHELDON, FS, INTERVIEWER
BOB SHELDON: Today is July 27th,
2004 and I’m here at the Office of Naval
Research to interview one of the founding
directors of MORS, Ervin Kapos. Tell me
where you were born and raised.
ERVIN KAPOS: I was born 21 June
1931 in Transylvania. I spent the first seven
years of my life in Romania. Then twelve
years in Cyprus, where I went to an Amer-
ican mission school, the American Acad-
emy.
BOB SHELDON: Back to Transylva-
nia, had your parents lived there their
whole life?
ERVIN KAPOS: There, and there-
abouts.
BOB SHELDON: What are your par-
ents’ names?
ERVIN KAPOS: Leo Kapos. (Pro-
nounced more nearly like Kah posh.) And
Elizabeth Barta Kapos.
BOB SHELDON: Did you go to school
in Transylvania?
ERVIN KAPOS: No. I spent a year or
two of kindergarten there in Transylvania,
and one year of primary school elsewhere
in Romania (Braila). Then we moved to
Cyprus.
BOB SHELDON:What was the reason
for moving to Cyprus?
ERVIN KAPOS: World War II was
looming, and my father was a very liberal
and humane person. He didn’t see the en-
vironment in Romania as being conducive
to raising his boys there. So he decamped in
1938.
BOB SHELDON: How many siblings
did you have?
ERVIN KAPOS: One. Ten years older.
BOB SHELDON: What year did you
leave Romania?
ERVIN KAPOS: We left there in 1938,
and I lived in Cyprus until 1950. As I said,
I attended an American mission school
there until 1948. Then in 1950, I came to the
United States. I have lived here ever since.
BOB SHELDON:What kind of courses
did you take at the mission school?
ERVIN KAPOS: Well, what was nor-
mal for primary and secondary school.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have lots of
math?
ERVIN KAPOS: Had lots of math.
Had lots of science. Had lots of humanities.
We put in a full school day.
BOB SHELDON:Any particular teach-
ers you remember that had an impact on
you?
ERVIN KAPOS: Oh, boy. Actually I
remember all of the teachers. And they all
had their various and sundry impacts.
BOB SHELDON: Tell me about your
math and science teachers.
ERVIN KAPOS: My math teacher was
a fellow named Mavrides. I don’t know
what his precise educational background
was, but he was a good teacher. He advised
me that I should study whatever I wanted,
because I was a fairly talented kid and
would do well at whatever I chose—but
not to major in mathematics. So, I majored
in mathematics. [Laughing]
BOB SHELDON: And your science
teacher?
ERVIN KAPOS: It was Mavrides
again. I don’t remember much of the sci-
ence, except that it was basically high
school physics.
BOB SHELDON: Then you left Cyprus
in 1950?
ERVIN KAPOS: ’50 and came to the
United States.
BOB SHELDON: Did your whole fam-
ily come?
ERVIN KAPOS: No, I came by myself.
I came to go to college, and I ended up at
Indiana University.
BOB SHELDON: How did you choose
Indiana University?
ERVIN KAPOS: That’s a good ques-
tion. For some reason there was a veritable
trail of predecessor students from the
American Academy in Cyprus to Indiana
University. That was about how it started: I
got into that trail. They had a famously
good foreign student program, so I went
there.
BOB SHELDON: What was your
major?
ERVIN KAPOS: I shilly-shallied for a
while, but it turned out to be mathematics.
BOB SHELDON: Applied mathemat-
ics or theoretical mathematics?
ERVIN KAPOS: As an undergraduate
those two things amount to the same thing.
Then I went on to graduate school at Indi-
ana University, and I went in for theoretical
mathematics, abstract algebra and things
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like that, with an extra sprinkling of Applied
Mathematics.
BOB SHELDON: Any notable professors
from your Algebra studies?
ERVIN KAPOS: There were a number of
them. There was an algebraist named Professor
McKenzie. On the applied side, the one I re-
member best was my advisor, Professor Eber-
hard Hopf. And there were others, of course,
each of whom had an impact.
BOB SHELDON: How was your move
from Cyprus to Indiana? A big change in life-
style?
ERVIN KAPOS: Well, it was. But then
again it was not. Remember, I had gone to an
American school, and so I’d gotten part of the
culture. I think I fit in rather easily. What was
different about me from most foreign students
was that I had to work my way through school.
By the time I had paid my first term’s fees and
my first month’s room and board, I had left
exactly twenty-four dollars. [Laughing] So, I
had to get ready to work, and I got ready to
work. I had a variety of jobs, from selling jew-
elry in the downtown credit jewelry (where I
was a big hit because of my funny accent), to
typing book lists for the university bookstore,
to typing W-2 forms for the university payroll
department. On and on. Then I got a job run-
ning projectors for the audio-visual depart-
ment. I finally got a research assistantship in
the geography department, and an editorial as-
sistantship in the history department. So, quite
a varied menu.
BOB SHELDON: So you were not just in-
terested in mathematics?
ERVIN KAPOS:No. I was not. And in fact,
fairly shortly I became research assistant at the
Institute for Educational Research there, and I
went from being a research assistant to being a
research associate. But I also had a fellowship
in mathematics, which ultimately turned into a
teaching fellowship.
BOB SHELDON: What courses did you
teach?
ERVIN KAPOS: Freshman courses.
BOB SHELDON: Did you continue for a
PhD?
ERVIN KAPOS: I did, but I didn’t finish.
I’m what’s known as an ABD [All But Disser-
tation].
BOB SHELDON: When you left Indiana
University, what was your first regular job?
ERVIN KAPOS: It was in the Operations
Evaluation Group, the OEG, which was then
operated by MIT under a contract with the
Navy. That was in 1958.
BOB SHELDON: How did you happen to
interview with them?
ERVIN KAPOS: They published an ad in
American Scientist, which struck me as very
snotty. They essentially said we can’t tell you
what our name is, and we can’t tell you what
we do, but send us your resume and we’ll tell
you why you’re not good enough to work for
us. That’s a very loose translation. And you
know, when you’re that age, something like
that is a challenge. So I wrote them a letter and
said hey, look, I’m much too good to have a
resume—however, let me tell you a bit about
me. And apparently this impressed the powers
that be. The fact that somebody could write a
letter in English. And a few days later here
comes the recruiter to interview me, and a few
weeks after that, I came to be interviewed in
Washington.
BOB SHELDON: Who was the recruiter?
ERVIN KAPOS: It was Jack Robinson. He
was the Jack-of-all-trades, you know, he re-
cruited, he ran document control for the Group,
and all kinds of things. As I say, I came to
Washington for an interview and was hired.
BOB SHELDON: What was your initial
project?
ERVIN KAPOS: It was an interesting
project. It was to optimize the employment of
aircraft carriers in the western Pacific for gen-
eral war. And that pretty much occupied my
first year.
BOB SHELDON: How did you approach
that problem?
ERVIN KAPOS: In pieces. In other words,
I took a look at the AAW [air-to-air warfare]
and the ASW [anti-submarine warfare] and
strike warfare and so on, and I don’t recall that
I had any particular methodology in mind. I
just examined the problem from all sides, and
then eventually suggested the solution.
BOB SHELDON: What was the solution?
ERVIN KAPOS: The solution was to oper-
ate the carriers in single-carrier task groups,
because that would maximize survivability and
it would not greatly handicap strike operations
as those were visualized at the time.
BOB SHELDON: Who did you brief the
results to?
ERVIN KAPOS: The Commander of the
7th Fleet.
BOB SHELDON: Did they accept them?
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ERVIN KAPOS: I’m sure they did. I did
not brief them myself. The OEG rep on the 7th
Fleet staff briefed them. And yes, as a matter of
fact, they did accept the recommendations.
BOB SHELDON: That’s good to have your
first study taken seriously.
ERVIN KAPOS: Yes, it was—although it
was not the only factor bearing on that deci-
sion. Especially considering the vicissitudes
that the study went through—or rather that I
went through because of the fact that I did not
finish the study before I went off to my first
field assignment and had to come back to finish
it. It was okay.
BOB SHELDON:What was your first field
assignment?
ERVIN KAPOS: It was in San Diego, at
COMOPTEVFORPAC, which was a new com-
mand at the time.
BOB SHELDON: Did you go out to sea
with them?
ERVIN KAPOS: No. OPTEVFOR is an op-
erational test and evaluation command, and
they are shore-based—one went to sea only to
observe individual tests. But I did get a sea
assignment for my second tour, which was con-
secutive to the first one, also in San Diego. I
was assigned as OEG rep to First Fleet, and
COMFIRSTFLT was put to sea just about the
time I arrived. In fact, I arrived just in time to
have my files transferred to the flagship.
BOB SHELDON: Did you find your sea
legs easy?
ERVIN KAPOS: Yes, at least I don’t re-
member any particular problems.
BOB SHELDON: Then you came back and
you finished up your study?
ERVIN KAPOS: I came back on TAD and
finished up my study during my first assign-
ment. That was the nature of discipline for not
finishing up before I left the home office.
BOB SHELDON: Was your study pub-
lished as a report or as a set of briefing slides?
ERVIN KAPOS: It was published as a re-
port.
BOB SHELDON: How many pages?
ERVIN KAPOS: Probably seventy.
BOB SHELDON: It was a substantial re-
port then. Did you have team partners?
ERVIN KAPOS: No, I was the only one.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have peers re-
view it?
ERVIN KAPOS: Actually, we did not have
peer reviews. It was reviewed by the higher-
ups. I had a team leader, who was Ralph Beatty.
And he had a division director over him, who
was probably Jim Hartzler. Whether my study
also got reviewed by the associate director and
the director, I don’t know.
BOB SHELDON: Name some of your
peers that you worked with then.
ERVIN KAPOS: The same year that I came
to OEG, George Haering joined; he subse-
quently became a big shot in strike warfare. I
also remember Marc Nerenstone. But the others
don’t come readily to mind, although there
were eleven of us in that entry “class”. The one
member of the group of roughly the same vin-
tage whom I remember is Phil Depoy. We are
friends to this day.
BOB SHELDON: How did you find your
work pace at OEG?
ERVIN KAPOS: The work pace was just a
normal office existence. Except we tended to
work nine hours a day, nine and a half hours a
day, just according to individual tastes. The
work pace in the field was really quite different
because in the field you, of course, integrated
into a Navy command. You worked whatever
hours the job demanded, very rarely less than
eight, and quite often more than twelve. At sea,
of course, there’s not much to do except work,
and so there it got to be fourteen hours a day. It
does good things for productivity I assure you.
BOB SHELDON: How many weeks did
you spend at sea?
ERVIN KAPOS: I was with First Fleet for
twelve months. We were technically at sea all
the time since we were aboard a flagship. The
flagship itself was at sea a week or two a
month. And then at the end of my tour, we
went off on a circuit of Southeast Asia, because
we were the contingency commander for
Southeast Asia at the time, and so that was
about eleven or twelve weeks. I came back after
my two assignments, which ran from 1959 to
1961.
BOB SHELDON: Before the Vietnam War
lit up?
ERVIN KAPOS: Yes. And once we came
back from Southeast Asia, I jumped ship. My
relief came aboard in Hawaii and I jumped ship
and came to Washington.
BOB SHELDON: What was your next
project?
ERVIN KAPOS: I came back here with
something of a reputation for understanding
Command and Control, because the NTDS had
been evaluated in task force operations when I
was at OPTEVFORPAC. I did not really under-
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . ERVIN KAPOS
Military Operations Research, V9 N4 2004 Page 57
stand Command and Control, but I had an
interest in it and so I began to gravitate towards
it. I became the OEG Scientific Analyst (as they
would call it), essentially on local field assign-
ment, to OP-35 which was the Command and
Control division of OPNAV, and then I was
loaned out to NAVCOSSACT, the Naval Com-
mand Systems Support Activity, which has
long since gone, as sort of an acting technical
director. It was a new command, just being
established. So I played at being a technical
director for two or three months. They eventu-
ally got a real one in place, because I certainly
was not a real one. Then I returned to OEG and,
after considerable discussion with the then di-
rector who was not at all sure he wanted to go
that way, was given the job of organizing a
Command and Control team. This was sort of
unprecedented for OEG where teams came in
place with names already. I did not appreciate
at the time how wonderful an opportunity it
was. But it was. And I built a team of five
people. We did Command and Control analysis
of various types. From tactical to not exactly
strategic, but at least operational.
BOB SHELDON: How did you approach
the problem?
ERVIN KAPOS: Well, there were prob-
lems and problems. For example, one of the
projects we did—and these are all done by in-
dividuals on my team, not by me, and not by
groups; group projects were not in fashion at
the time, at least not in that place—was to look
at the factors that affected the effectiveness of
electronic warfare systems in defending ships
against missile attack. This turned out to be a
legitimate command and control project, be-
cause decision delays turned out to play a ma-
jor role in the effectiveness of the devices. An-
other one dealt with the utility of satellite
communications and what kind of satellites the
Navy should want. We looked at CPXs [Com-
mand Post Exercises] and analyzed results of
CPXs, with a view to determining what infor-
mation flows characterized crisis operations,
and then we transitioned from CPXs to real-
world crises such as the Cuban missile crisis
and the Dominican Republic crisis. We had
quite a diverse program—but diversity has its
penalties. I mean, some say your impact is nec-
essarily very localized.
BOB SHELDON:Who posed the problems
for you to study?
ERVIN KAPOS: There is no simple answer
to that question. For the most part, a consensus
just evolved between ourselves and the client
about what was to be done, as in the case of the
EW analysis. The satellite study was requested
by the management of the Center for Naval
Analysis, to patch a hole left by a program that
had run its course. The CPX analysis was more
or less self-initiated, except that we needed the
real data from the field and so we had to con-
vince the command in the field that it was for a
worthy cause. It was a peculiarity of OEG at the
time that we were pretty much left to select
problems. The director, of course, had to ap-
prove them and there was a process for doing
that.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of decisions
did the studies impact? Were they acquisition
decisions or operational decisions?
ERVIN KAPOS: Both actually. It was not
always easy to see the impact. You made your
little input and hoped for the best. Except that
toward the end of my time, I discovered a
Naval officer who carried around with him in
his briefcase all of the stuff that we had pub-
lished from my program—all of the communi-
cations analyses—and who could tell me more
about the results than I could remember myself.
He would pull out the right piece of paper to
influence a decision on the table.
BOB SHELDON: He was your marketing
guy?
ERVIN KAPOS: Yes, and he did a great
job.
BOB SHELDON: How long did you spend
at the OEG?
ERVIN KAPOS: I was in OEG for fourteen
and a half years. I had a year in OEG Washing-
ton to begin with. And I had two years in the
field. Then I had four years and a bit with the
Command and Control team—which in itself is
unusual in length, but it took that long to de-
velop a program, to run the program, and to
develop a successor and all of that. Then I went
to CINCPACFLT, as the senior OEG represen-
tative. By now the war was in full swing. And
I did combat analysis with CINCPACFLT.
BOB SHELDON: What kinds of combat
analyses?
ERVIN KAPOS: Here again, we had a
team of five people. And different individuals
did different pieces of analysis. I did strike
analysis and aircraft attrition analysis, and
things of that nature, and I did oversight of the
work that everybody else was doing. Some-
body studied air-to-air combat. Somebody else
studied the effectiveness of strike support, and
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so on. The problems obviously shifted over
time.
BOB SHELDON: Can you remember any
particular strike studies during the Vietnam
War that you were involved with? The impact
of those studies?
ERVIN KAPOS: The impact was immedi-
ate, because we put out essentially weekly or
bi-weekly analysis reports. And they went to
the people on the front lines. As for an example
of a strike study I was involved with, probably
the best example was the analysis of the Rusty
Nail strike series against the Hanoi/Haiphong
area in December of 1966—an isolated series of
strikes that required us to work pretty much
day and night to get an assessment of how they
had gone.
BOB SHELDON: What kinds of recom-
mendations came out of those?
ERVINKAPOS:One recommendation that
came out of an analysis done by Frank Shoup,
who was one of my colleagues there, was on
penetration and egress tactics. He suggested
that they fly over 8,500 feet with at least two or
three thousand feet of clear air beneath them, to
be able to see and avoid surface-to-air missiles,
because evasion turned out to be the most ef-
fective tactic against the SA-2 missile of that
day.
BOB SHELDON: Where were you physi-
cally located then?
ERVIN KAPOS: At CINCPACFLT head-
quarters in Makalapa. It’s on Oahu, on the
fringes of Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii. I was there
for thirteen months. Then I came back. Having
been in the business of combat analysis, I was
commissioned to organize the Southeast Asia
combat analysis division in order to match up
with the Southeast Asia combat analysis group
in the Pentagon. I did that. I had twenty ana-
lysts at that time continuously analyzing air,
surface, and support warfare. And again, we
had a very fruitful time of it. The most avid
consumers of our analysis were the Navy head-
quarters types, of course. But we also reported
to the operational commanders on matters of
interest to them. I did that for thirteen
months—plus five, because I was to be relieved
by Phil Depoy, and he was finishing up his
thesis. But after thirteen months, I became di-
rector of the Marine Corps Operations Analysis
Group, while also keeping the Southeast Asia
group for about five months—something that I
don’t think the Marines were really privy to.
BOB SHELDON: This Marine Corps anal-
ysis group you headed, did that evolve into
MCCDC at Quantico?
ERVIN KAPOS: No. MCCDC is the Ma-
rine Corps Combat Development Command
and it is a command. The Marine Corps Oper-
ations Analysis Group, or MCOAG as we called
it, was just what its name implies—an analysis
group. We had tasking from various parts of
the Marine Corps. But the fact was that the
Marines were busy fighting a war, and so I
made it my business to swing the program over
to combat analysis. We continued with one
project which was being done for Headquar-
ters, which was to do a Leontieff model of the
Marine Corps’ resource allocation, and that
turned out to be very useful. Otherwise, we
pretty much concentrated on combat analysis.
After thirteen months—thirteen months seems
to have been a common theme in my career at
that time—as the head of the Marine Corps
Operations Analysis Group, I returned to OEG,
and was there for about four years.
BOB SHELDON: How many people were
in OEG then?
ERVIN KAPOS: About forty-seven when I
started and about a hundred and twenty when
I finished.
BOB SHELDON: What was growth due
to? More interest in studies or growth in the
military?
ERVIN KAPOS: It was nothing very sub-
tle. It was partly organic growth in OEG, which
was rather anemic at the time. We also picked
up the ASW Tactical Analysis Groups during
my tenure, as a matter of fact more or less
simultaneously with my accession, and that
was another forty or so analysts. We also estab-
lished a military component: for the first time
CNA began to get military officers—and even
some enlisted personnel with appropriate qual-
ifications, partly as a result of an initiative of
mine—and I got my share of those. One of the
things I started in OEG was something we
called “Red Side OA”, which required the per-
sonal support of the CNO, then Admiral Zum-
walt. Under it, a military-civilian team in OEG
reconstructed Soviet naval tactics—yes, Vir-
ginia, that was back in the days when the So-
viets were the red side—based on all the data
that was available from any source, and we
produced detailed research memoranda on the
results (more or less under the rubric of know
your enemy). But we also produced a “bridge
manual”, called Red ATP-1, which was given
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the widest distribution in the fleet and had
quite an impact on the specificity of threat
awareness. Red Side OAwas run by a colleague
of mine called John Pierce.
I was in OEG for four years plus some, and
then I left and entered the private sector. I went
to work for a tiny little outfit called Ketron,
Incorporated. John Kettelle owned it, and he
recruited me because I was looking for some
useful obscurity at the time, having decided to
leave OEG. I worked there for eleven years, and
grew it from a tiny little outfit, grossing maybe
half a million dollars to one grossing maybe
twenty million. I spent three years as Vice-
President for Washington, and then four years
as Executive Vice-President for the whole com-
pany. Then I had four years as President of the
company. We supported really several sectors.
The Philadelphia operation, which was located
at Valley Forge, had grown its business on the
Naval Air Development Center nearby. They
were supporting the technologists and the lo-
gisticians there. And they gradually developed
their business into the non-Navy and civil side.
They had a Vice-President of their own—Dave
Knies, a very capable fellow. The Washington
operation, which was mine, had a clientele that
looked an awful lot like OEG’s clientele. The
work was an awful lot like it as well. We did a
whole gamut of things—combat analysis, intel-
ligence analysis, acquisition “analysis”. It was a
very fruitful sort of existence. I have nothing
but fond memories of it. Then at the end of
1982, I quit and started Kapos Associates,
which I ran until the year 2000.
BOB SHELDON: How many were in Ka-
pos Associates initially?
ERVIN KAPOS: Five. We started kind of
first class, with an administrative person, and a
financial person and three technical people.
Then we grew rather rapidly for a while.
BOB SHELDON: What was your business
market?
ERVIN KAPOS: Navy, initially. We
worked for ONR and we worked for OPNAV
on the Navy’s Surface Warfare Plan, and then
things just sort of “growed”. We did the war
games for the Atlantic Fleet Tactical Command
Readiness Program—LANTFLT TCRP to its
friends, of whom there were not many by the
time the program expired 17 years after it was
started during my years with Ketron—and we
got into terrorism studies long before that was
fashionable. So it was a natural thing that we
began to do terrorism gaming on a joint and
interagency basis, which was our first major
foray into that world, although to be sure we
had had some joint work long before that. And
then it was just as natural that we did a pro-
gram of DoD-wide war games on Y2K—re-
member Y2K?—and took that interagency
wide. All of that was very rewarding. Then my
company was acquired by another somewhere
along there, in the fall of 1999, and in the fall of
2000 I resigned. After all those years in and
around the private sector—42 by then—I al-
lowed myself to be recruited by the Chief of
Naval Research, Rear Admiral Jay Cohen, to
come to the Office of Naval Research as some-
thing new for ONR, the head of an Operations
Analysis Program. And here I am—where you
are talking to me—running an analysis pro-
gram that is oriented partly toward an outside
clientele, the fleet, and partly toward an inside
clientele, ONR itself. It is going quite well, al-
though some of the practical problems of get-
ting projects started and keeping them going
are uncomfortably reminiscent of what I expe-
rienced in the private sector.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s turn to the history
of your involvement with MORS. When did
you begin to attend the symposia?
ERVIN KAPOS: It seems to me that I at-
tended two or three symposia beginning about
the 3rd MORS—perhaps all three of the 3rd, 4th,
and 5th Symposia, or at any rate two of them.
These were all out on the West Coast, and I was
there myself on my first two OEG field assign-
ments, as I mentioned. Then the next MORS I
attended was the 9th, which was held at Fort
Monroe in Virginia in (I think) the spring of
1962, and that was where I first began to par-
ticipate actively. I was in the Command and
Control working group, and I remember tan-
gling with Herman Kahn on the subject of
Command and Control—if trying to have a
discussion with Herman Kahn can be called
tangling with him. Perhaps as a result, I found
myself on the Board of Directors later that year.
About 1965, several of us on the Board (I will
not identify the others to protect the guilty)
began to explore the possibility of having
MORS merge with ORSA, with the classified
symposia to be run under contract with that
organization. However, this idea did not find
favor—which is code for having been univer-
sally hated—and so we contented ourselves
with being the charter members of the new
Military Applications Section of ORSA, but I
am afraid I did not ever become really active in
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that organization. I continued on the MORS
board, where I was elected Vice President but
did not accede to the presidency, and with
MORS activities generally.
BOB SHELDON: What were these activi-
ties?
ERVIN KAPOS: They included presenting
a significant number of papers on my own and
with co-authors, serving as Command & Con-
trol working group co-chair and chairman,
serving as Contributed Papers chairman and, I
believe, as General Sessions co-chair. At this
point, I went off on another OEG field assign-
ment in 1966, to CINCPACFLT, and so on. In
any event, I remained active in MORS until
perhaps the 40th MORS, not attending every
symposium but the vast majority. Then I fell off
the wagon and did not participate in any fur-
ther symposia—until I agreed to attend the
Heritage Session at the Quantico meeting.
BOB SHELDON: How have the Symposia
evolved in recent years?
ERVIN KAPOS: For one thing, the number
of attendees is startlingly larger, to the point
where I suspect it may soon become necessary
to start limiting it, if it does not level off. Sec-
ondly, at least based on a very small sample of
papers that come my way for information, the
Working Group papers are of a much higher
quality than they used to be. I presume that the
General Session papers have similarly im-
proved in quality. Mind you, there are still a
number that make one wonder why the author
bothered, but I suspect that those will always
be with us. All in all, the hard-working folks
who put together the Symposia these days have
every reason to feel pleased with themselves.
BOB SHELDON: Any other last com-
ments?
ERVIN KAPOS: I don’t think so. Anything
else would be belaboring the point.
The following transcript is from the MORS Her-
itage Session at the 71st MORS Symposium at
Quantico, Virginia, 11 June 2003.
First speaker: Ervin Kapos
I stand before you in truth both proud and
humble because this is my first official intro-
duction as a fossil. Actually, being a fossil is
more complicated than you might suppose be-
cause it occurs to me that I am not sure whether
to be humble about my pride or be proud of my
humility. I don’t propose to resolve that on
your time, but I do have to think about it.
I probably have the flimsiest claim of any of
the speakers to be here. I was the director of the
Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group of
the Center for Naval Analysis for thirteen
months, thirty-five years ago. For five of those
thirteen months I was also doing my previous
job as director of the South East Asia Combat
Analysis Division of the Operations Evaluation
Group. So, a lot of that time, of those five
months, I was unconscious. The rest of the time
I probably wasn’t paying as much attention as
I should have been, because I have relatively
few recollections.
I was told to reminisce. So we will do a
little basic reminiscing. Then I would like to
talk a little bit about my perception of how
analysis around the Marine Corps has evolved.
I am tempted to be a smart-aleck and say “not
much”, but that would not be fair. It is not a
question of evolution onward and upward so
much as it is a question of some sea changes,
most of which have been more good than bad.
And, by way of full disclosure, for most of these
intervening thirty-five years I have not been
much of a direct participant in Marine Corps
matters or Marine Corps-oriented analysis. I
have been mostly an observer. I have mostly
been a leech, sucking off other people’s experi-
ences, and so there is very limited first-hand
content to any of this. People are used to listen-
ing to me with a grain of salt; I suggest two
grains today.
Just to cover the territory before my Marine
Corps Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG)
tour briefly, I started in this business almost
forty-five years ago on August 10, 1958, which
if we reckon really quickly is forty-four years
and nine months and one day and, by now,
roughly six hours—but who’s counting? I
joined the Operations Evaluation Group in the
days before there was a Center for Naval Anal-
ysis around it. I went through the requisite
hazing during my first year of doing a couple
projects I was incompetent to do, and then I
went off to the field. I spent a year at the Op-
erational Test and Evaluation Force in the Pa-
cific and a year on First Fleet staff. Then I came
back to Washington and established a Com-
mand and Control analysis team in the Opera-
tions Evaluation Group.
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After a few years of running that, I went off
to CINCPACFLT during the war—Bruce Pow-
ers joined me there I believe—and then came
back and established a South East Asia Combat
Analysis Division in OEG. I ran that for thirteen
months, but on a Monday I was told that, as of
that day, I was the Director of the Marine Corps
Operations Analysis Group. (As it turned out, I
continued to run SEACAD in parallel with my
MCOAG duties for a further five months, until
Phil DePoy was available to relieve me.)
I was innocent of any Marine Corps back-
ground. What I knew about the Marine Corps
was essentially what one picked up in the
course of normal professional activity around
the Navy, which was not a lot. I had been out
drinking with the Fleet Marine Officer a couple
of times, and that was probably more useful.
However, I was at no disadvantage relative to
Headquarters, Marine Corps because they had
about the same amount of notice as I did that I
was showing up; they knew my name and that
was about all. There was a Deputy Chief of
Staff for Research, Development & Studies, at
that time Brigadier General (later Lieutenant
General) Lou Metzger; and he had a Chief Sci-
entist, Al Slafkosky, now retired. They were the
people I reported to in the Marine Corps.
I was in the business of learning about Ma-
rine Corps analysis because, if I knew about the
Marine Corps what one picked up casually in
the course of normal activity, I didn’t know
anything about Marine Corps analysis. The Ma-
rine Corps Operations Analysis Group was a
few years old at that point, having been
founded as a division of the Operations Evalu-
ation Group, not then of the Center for Naval
Analysis for the simple reasons that there was
not a Center for Naval Analysis. With the es-
tablishment of the Center for Naval Analysis, it
ultimately became an independent group. Its
first director in its OEG days, and continuing
on under CNA, was Russ Coile, retired now but
still active professionally though not in military
OR; and I was the second. The group was some
twenty people strong, plus or minus two. There
were a couple of active duty Marines attached
to us, not analysts but bravely doing their ut-
most. At some point, I seem to remember some
guy named Major Al Gray showing up to see if
there was anything he could do to help—
maybe I just dreamed it. In any event, he went
away relatively quickly, as there were presum-
ably more useful things for him to do.
The program was sort of interesting. At
that point, there was a small group down here
at Quantico, helping with evaluations and ex-
periments and things like that. I think five peo-
ple. And there were maybe three or four people
up in CNA headquarters, doing Headquarters-
Marine Corps-ish small analyses; let’s call them
chores for lack of better word. And over 50% of
the group was doing a giant input/output
model of the entire Marine Corps, a Leontieff
model. This took me aback a little bit. I didn’t
recall reading about Leontieff models in
“Search and Screening”, which is what all of us
kind of grew up on. I do not think even the
Naval Postgraduate School teaches Leontieff
models, although I will not insist on that. But,
existence proof, there was at least one project in
which people actually tried to do something
with a Leontieff model.
Three things were striking about this. First,
this was a very big project for the normal scale
of things at that time. The second was it was not
clear that it was going anywhere, at least not to
me. The third was that in 1968, at what might
be reasonably called the height of the Vietnam
unpleasantness, there was no combat analysis
going on. There was no operational data flow-
ing into MCOAG. There were no analysts out
collecting anything. There was nothing being
done. I thought this was sort of dramatic, par-
ticularly since I had just come from running the
South East Asia Combat Analysis Division,
which had been set up at the express behest of
the Chief of Naval Operations. So after a short
of period of mutual acclimatization, four or five
days, I went back to the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Research, Development & Studies, and pro-
posed cutting the input/output model effort in
half, and taking the effort that was freed up and
putting it into Combat Analysis.
This got a bit of attention for a couple of
reasons. First, there were an awful lot of rice
bowls tied up with a project of that size. I had
been in the trade not quite ten years at that
point and I did not understand about rice
bowls. (If anybody would like a short course on
rice bowls, do come and see me: I have had 35
years since then to get to understand them.) So
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all of the owners of rice bowls rose up in rage.
The second reason why this got some attention
was that it clearly entailed putting analysts in
the combat zone; I was not proposing that
somebody feed us data and we would analyze
it. That didn’t seem reasonable, particularly in
view of the need for analysts to understand the
environment in which the data was generated.
I was proposing that we send some people out,
get some data, do some analysis forward, and
also do some analysis back here. And this is a
point I would like to emphasize. This was con-
sidered to be revolutionary at the time. It’s not
revolutionary any more; it is accepted as a mo-
dus operandi, which is a heck of a good thing.
You know how we are inclined to grumble
about how things don’t progress? If you would
like an existence proof for real progress, the fact
that this is a normal modus operandi right now
is not a bad existence proof.
The answer was absolutely not. After a cou-
ple of weeks, it turned out to be relatively not.
And after a couple of months, we had a couple
of people in Vietnam. I am not going to pretend
to you that we accomplished very much; in fact
arguably we didn’t really accomplish anything
except establish a proof of principle, if you like.
There was some analysis done proving the
point that it could be done in-country; and
there were some resources pulled out of Mr.
Leontieff’s pocket and put into the applied op-
erations analysis pocket. But I was only there
for thirteen months. If I had the makings of
somebody who would revolutionize Opera-
tions Analysis in the Marine Corps—and that’s
a big IF—I didn’t have the time. But let’s not
poormouth me: I did make some changes. I was
relieved by Bob Gigliotti, and I went back to be
director of the Operations Evaluation Group.
After a few years of running that, I went off into
the private sector, where I spent the next 28
years before abruptly turning into a fed two
and a half years ago.
The point of this recitation is that, ever
thereafter, I did not have very much to do
directly with analysis in the Marine Corps,
which is why I am limited in the amount of
reminiscing I can do. To be sure, in later years,
after my tour in OEG, I was involved with some
Marine Corps things. We did some analysis
and, by the way, looking just on the instant at
the overall complexion of the things I was in-
volved with, they turned out to have been
rather war gaming heavy. And there is, I think,
a useful object lesson hidden there, too, an evo-
lutionary lesson—let me get back to that in a
moment. Sticking to the chronology for the mo-
ment, I did get to do some analysis and then
some war gaming with colleagues on counter-
terrorism—not anti-terrorism, counter-terror-
ism. The Marines had established the notion of
the special operations capable Marine Expedi-
tionary Unit, the MEU(SOC). It turned out that
there was a rather delicate interaction between
an already deployed MEU(SOC) and another
joint mission that would deploy on the occur-
rence of an event, and so the Commandant,
who was by now General Gray, decided that
this interface needed to be explored—defined
before somebody got killed—and that war
gaming (he had been exposed to some of my
games when he was in the Fleet Marine Force)
would be a good way to do it. It was fascinating
stuff.
Now for the point I would like to make
about war gaming—I might as well make it
now as later—is this. A war game, of course, is
not analysis, we all know that. Do we? I hope
we do. I mean, it’s one iteration of a Monte
Carlo process that you would like to have 500
iterations of. Well, you’re going to get three if
you’re good; you’re going to get three if you’re
lucky. And you will get five if you’re both good
and lucky, because that is the way of the world.
So the analytical potential in any rigorous sense
of war gaming, I will assert, is pretty limited. It
is nonetheless a very good way of exploring
structures and processes, and getting enough
definition for vague problems so that you can
begin to model them more rigorously, whereas
you couldn’t perhaps do that without war gam-
ing. The Marines have, over the years, turned
more and more heavily to war gaming. That’s a
good thing. They have gone through various
iterations of heavily model-supported games,
to not at all model-supported games; closed
games and seminar-type games. It doesn’t
much matter, because it is all in support of
analysis—as long as the analysis gets done.
In my present practice, in the Office of Na-
val Research, I view war gaming as what I call
the ‘analytical stiletto’ for people who view
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analytical studies as a blunt instrument that
somebody is about to wield on their heads.
Even those people can be made to be receptive
to games which are relatively concrete, they’re
participatory. And what one doesn’t need to
make a big fuss about is that, if they are set up
on some reasonably rigorous quasi-analytical
basis, they can provide very useful insights
about certain processes and maybe a basis for
hypotheses about outcomes. It does not feel like
analysis at all. You’re not being hit over the
head. It can be inserted between your ribs—the
analytical stiletto.
Then in 1986, I got the opportunity to do an
analytical study on, hold your hats, Marine
Corps General Officer Requirements. That was
an interesting thing to be willing to subject to
Operations Analysis. Was it the millennium?
No, in 1986 it was not the millennium, but you
certainly could confuse it for the millennium.
The story on that was that the Navy, sensing a
Congressional mandate coming, decided to
start looking at the number of flag officers it
needed. And somehow—the how having a lot
to do with who knew somebody, who knew
somebody, who knew somebody, who knew
me and thought I could do it—I got the oppor-
tunity to set up that study.
There didn’t seem to be any precedents,
and I was not given the time to do a whole lot
of homework. So I went ahead and invented a
methodology, which seemed to go down well.
When I briefed the then-commandant, General
P.X. Kelly, on the study, he said, “What would
it take for you to do this for the Marine Corps?”
Now remember the Navy paid for the method-
ology. So the hint was, keep it cheap. So for a
price that was approximately one-eighth of the
Navy study, I did a Marine Corps analysis.
Why is one-eighth important? Because the nor-
mal Navy/Marine Corps ratio in flag/general
officers is four to one, and so we have that to
show that the study was a real bargain. The
results went down quite well. Both with the
Marine Corps and with the Congress, and I was
very happy and went back to sleep. Ten years
later, I got to do it again. No good deed goes
unpunished!
The interesting thing is that not much hap-
pened in the wake of the study in 1986–87; but
in 1996–97, the Marines marched up on the Hill
with the analysis—with their own judgment
superimposed, which was to scale back their
request from what I had recommended—and
they came away with twelve additional general
officer billets which, on a base of 58, was not too
shabby. There are guys out there that think I am
really neat for having pulled that off—which I
really didn’t do—and some of them are still on
active duty, after all it has only been six years.
But this was interesting stuff to do; I think more
importantly, it blazed some interesting trails in
willingness to submit even unlikely issues to
rigorous—how rigorous can I be?—quasi-rig-
orous analysis. (Let me explain quasi-rigorous.
It is not as good as rigorous, but is better than
pseudo-rigorous.) So my work blazed some
trails in willingness to submit these kinds of
pretty sensitive, almost social, issues to quasi-
rigorous analysis.
A bit later, I was doing some war gaming
for the Navy, actually for OSD and then for the
Navy, on Y2K. Remember Y2K, the disaster
that didn’t happen? Maybe because we pre-
vented it from happening? Well, I produced
some games. The Marine Corps participated in
a DON game—because of proportional repre-
sentation, some of themwere invited. And their
conclusion was, “Gee, this might not be bad for
us.” So, we ran a couple of Y2K games. One of
the participants is the excellent landlord of this
place where we are meeting, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Ed Hanlon, who came away with a good
taste in his mouth. This is terribly important.
War gaming can get you lots of enemies who
will be more determined than your admirers
typically; so you can use two admirers for one
enemy!
And that, until very recently, has been just
about the sum total of what I have done as an
analyst around the Marine Corps. Not very
much is it? I told you right at the outset, I have
the flimsiest of claims to be up here.
At the beginning of 2001, I joined the Office
of Naval Research, as Director of a new Oper-
ations Analysis program. ONR had never had
an Operations Analysis program. Arguably it
still doesn’t, but there is hope. Within ONR is a
segment of the program which is Marine
Corps-oriented: there is a segment of the 6.1/
6.2 basic science and technology program, and
then there are two Future Naval Capabilities
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programs—FNCs are more applied, focusing
on technologies that can transition into acqui-
sition—which are Marine Corps-oriented.
I have a charter to evaluate FNCs. Who
wrote me that charter? Nice thing about being
the first in an office, I did it and nobody said no.
Here is where the analytical stiletto came in.
The so-called Littoral Combat FNC was just
forming, and I said, “How about a utility anal-
ysis, a military utility analysis?” And they said,
“Give us a break, we are not even started yet.”
I said, “Well, how about a game to define your
problem set?” “Oh, that is not such a bad idea.”
The next step was, “How about an analysis of
the game?” “Well, all right.” That didn’t come
out too badly. So pretty soon there was another
game. I must give the credit for the initiation of
these games to the Marine Corps people in
ONR because it took their being willing to take
the risk to do them. Pretty soon there was an-
other game to define the Marine Corps interest
in Sea Basing. If you don’t speak from Sea
Basing, look up CNO’s Sea Power 21, the Sea
Basing pillar of that nice “evolutionary” con-
cept of what has been done with the Navy/
Marine forces for a very long time. But none-
theless, it produced a good game, also a good
analysis, which is about to be published.
So we are making progress in bringing war
gaming and analysis into closer confluence,
which I think is important. I mean, I would
expect analysis to define what needs to be
gamed because it can’t quite analyze it yet, and
I would expect the gaming to lay the founda-
tions for analysis that you couldn’t quite do
earlier—and so on in a rolling cycle, which is a
matter of perpetual employment. It should go
on forever.
I think things are going that way, and I
think that is very healthy. There are issues of
what things cost: are war games expensive rel-
ative to analysis? Are they cheap relative to
analysis? I don’t want to get into that because
that depends a lot on how you do either one or
both, and I have nothing really useful to say on
that subject.
Meanwhile we’ve had a Gulf War and we
have had another Gulf-ish war, although we
don’t call it that, and we have had a war in
Afghanistan. And the Marine Corps has sys-
tematically deployed analysts, uniformed guys
and civilian people from CNA, from MCOAG.
It is taken for granted. This is a really good
thing. We have evolved a long way. We have a
good way to evolve yet. And I would like to go
ahead and sling a couple of ideas—not darts,
but a couple of ideas—out there regarding
things that we could stand to do better.
First, the analysis that is done on these
combat operations tends to be focused on very
tightly defined needs that somebody defined.
There is not very much looking at data to dis-
cover problems and solutions for those prob-
lems. The focus tends to be over-defined and
perhaps overly focused on Washington needs,
take it for what it’s worth. But, of course, the
Marines have very limited studies and analysis
resources. The Marine Corps studies program
is very tightly defined. I mean it is sliced and
diced into little blocks, and over-specified. I
think that, I hope that, things will continue to
evolve in the direction of letting the business of
answering pre-defined questions yield to some
extent to just messing around with the data in a
discovery mode. These two things will not,
need not, become equally important, but I
would like to see it be something other than
100% and 0%. What’s the right ratio? I don’t
know, cut your own. Three to one is not bad as
far as I am concerned, because you’re not talk-
ing about a huge block of resources and there is
a question of critical mass on the lower side, on
the smaller side. But I don’t care what the ratio
is. What I do care about is that there should be
a philosophical viewpoint, if you like, that we
are going to divide up the pie in this fashion.
Look! Yes, we understand the problems well
enough so that we can—we, the non-analysts
can—define them down to a gnat’s eyelash for
the analysts who don’t understand. Yet, the
problem is to discover what we don’t under-
stand. That is so obvious it’s hardly worth stat-
ing, but it is important nevertheless to realize it.
A second observation has to do with the
dominance of the database. My goodness, but
are we in love with databases—big structured
databases. This is a love affair, which means
that we throw away data because they don’t fit
the pre-conceived structure of the database.
Once we have thrown the data away, there is
not much discovering to be done. I would like
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to see big structured databases happen second,
not first—after the data is well enough under-
stood so that it can be properly annotated as to
conditions and so on, and therefore can be flex-
ibly used. As it is, stuff is piled in as soon as it
is gotten. I think it is pretty untidy. The Navy
learned this lesson with the old Fleet ASW Data
Analysis Program, FADAP, and has re-learned
it periodically. It is a lesson that I think neces-
sarily has to be re-learned periodically. But,
again, you can’t go out there and collect every-
thing—the vacuum sweeper approach, the
Hoover approach, to data. I know that. But
when you do collect data, don’t store it in struc-
tured databases before you have tried to do
analysis with it, some analysis with it. Structure
your database after you understand the charac-
ter and the uses for the data. There is, right
now—remember, I watch at a distance—there
is a kind of tyranny of the database, which I
would very much like to see broken.
Finally, experimentation and the role of
analysis in that. The Marines have a pretty
good experimentation process at the Marine
Corps War Fighting Lab—where they have a
hefty representation of both uniformed and
CNA analysts. (Footnote: I tried to break in
there when I was a contractor and didn’t suc-
ceed, so there must be something wrong.) And
they have a kind of an SOP for how do you
define a problem and how do you set up an
analysis. It seems a little simplistic; it is almost
at field manual level. But then I looked at this
and I asked myself, “How would I do this
better?” The answer is, “I wouldn’t.” It’s a
pretty good way of doing things. The Navy is
not anywhere near on as solid ground. And so
that has been, I think, pretty close to exemplary.
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